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Terror Poses New Concerns
Wilson John
The recent serial bombings in India’s two major cities, Bangaluru (or Bangalore, the capital city of Karnataka) and Ahmedabad (Gujarat) in July, indicated a growth in the number of those willing to take part in, or abet, acts of terror. The 16 blasts in Ahmedabad, as well as the discovery of 22 live bombs with integrated circuits from the diamond city of Surat, clearly showed the involvement of a large network of local men, and perhaps women, in aiding the coalition of terror networks that had been carrying out attacks in different places in India over the past three years.
What largely went unnoticed in the melee of conflicting reports about the serial blasts is the failure of the intelligence agencies, and the local police, in working diligently on the leads they had about the possibility of SIMI carrying out serial bombings as early as March 2008. There were other ominous signs which needed urgent attention. The bombings carried out meticulously and with locally rigged explosives reveal a rapid evolution in the character of the group or groups involved in the terrorist operation. An analysis of the serial blasts which began in October 2005 in Delhi showed the emergence of a multilayered structure with a striking resemblance to the organisational chart of Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI).
The swiftly changing modus operandi and objectives are an indicator of the emergence of a command and control structure within India, unlike in the past when terror attacks were masterminded largely from Pakistan or Dubai. The deliberate attack on Hindu festivals and temples (Delhi, Varanasi and Ayodhya) to trigger communal violence; the change of tactics for the same objective by carrying out planned attacks on Muslim-dominated areas of Hyderabad and Malegaon, the bombing of Samjhauta Express and Ajmer Sharif to prove the emergence of a Hindu terrorist group, and the targeting of Bangaluru, the multi-billion dollar software hub of India, and Ahmedabad showed a mastermind group at work. The clever ploys of using red herrings like old newspapers from different cities to wrap the explosives (as in Samjhauta Express bombing) or planting bombs on tree tops and billboards as in Surat recently confirmed careful planning and coordination at work.
The second rung of ‘operational commanders’ of these terror groups were drawn from well-to-do families with good educational qualifications as well as seminaries, both with serious imagined and real grievances against the Indian state or the majority Hindu community and are, therefore, willing to ‘teach a lesson’. The author of the 14-page “Indian Mujahideen” manifesto reportedly belonged to this group — knew the language and technology, qualities which were absent in the madrasa-trained jehadis of the past. A Hindi or Urdu version of the manifesto was yet to surface, indicating the objective of targeting educated Muslims with extremist propaganda, the first such media-driven attempt which was likely to multiply in the months ahead.
This group was responsible for expanding the network of allies and supporters among the community, masquerading as human rights organizations and non-governmental groups or evangelists. They organized protests, distributed hate literature and helped networking with the diaspora beyond the traditional support base in the Gulf countries. The foot-soldiers, who form the third rung, were recruited often from the families of victims of riots or State repression or from criminal gangs, like the ones operating in Mumbai, for a mixture of religious and mercenary considerations. These men worked on a need-to-know basis, carrying out specific tasks of planting bombs, and facilitating the stay and later escape of ‘field operatives‘ and operational commanders.
An effective counter-terrorist strategy in such circumstances call for a federal agency, as being demanded, set up under a distinct Act of Parliament to give it the required autonomy in functioning and funding, two factors which have stymied past attempts to forge a coordinated approach to countering terrorist networks in India. The absence of a comprehensive, searchable, database on SIMI had been one of the critical factors undermining the national manhunt for terrorist groups which had grown from ‘home-grown’ levels to merge seamlessly with a pan-Asian terror network. A national information grid of violent, extremist, criminal and terrorist groups and activities accessible at the State capital level to begin with has become imperative. Such centres, incorporating various open source monitoring units run by different agencies, can operate from some of the already-sanctioned multi-agency centres. Even these actions would prove to be ineffective if India delayed strengthening its police forces, the first line of defence against internal threats posed by the present cocktail of terror groups. (ADNI)