Asad Mirza
(The writer is a Delhi-based senior political and international affairs commentator)
As the threat of a direct conflict between Israel and Iran grows, several Gulf countries are reportedly working actively to prevent potential Israeli attacks on Iran’s oil facilities. According to reports, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are lobbying Washington to stop Israel from attacking Iran’s oil sites. They have also reportedly refused to allow Israel to fly over their airspace for any attack on Iran.
The war in Palestine has exceeded the one-year mark. At one end of the spectrum, most global nations paying lip service have continued to counsel Israel to stop its attacks in Palestine, though clandestinely helping it with arms and ammunition and monetary support. At the other end of the spectrum, the entry of Iran into the conflict has further involved the regional Arab states in a bigger picture. Most of these Arab states advocate a two-state formula to resolve the conflict, but to put a stop to the current ongoing conflict, the real politics has forced them to adopt a more tolerant attitude towards Iran, which was once considered their arch enemy both in defence and ideological terms.
Experts say that efforts to stop an escalation of hostilities are vital to prevent serious consequences for the global economy. After the Iranian missile attack, it is being speculated that Israel may target oil or nuclear facilities in Iran. And Tehran can choose to respond with either a direct attack on Israel or shutting the Strait of Hormuz—the world’s most important oil transit point—a fifth of global oil flows through the Strait, thus further flaring oil prices.
However, in the current scenario, the most obvious question on everyone’s mind is whether the Arab states will support Iran if it gets directly involved in the war. So far, it has acted through its proxy non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. But in the case of Iran getting more directly involved, future alliances may be forged based on religious ideology and the geographical locations of different Arab states.
Though the greater chances are that if an all-out war breaks out, Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates are unlikely to support Iran at any cost inimical to them or their regional interests.
Based on traditional religious ideological differences and conflicting ambitions, most Arab governments view Iran as an adversary. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Saudi Arabia has pursued much closer ties with the United States than Iran. Riyadh and Tehran have only recently begun to mend ties.
On 10 March 2023, representatives of Iran and Saudi Arabia, who had been meeting secretly for five days in the Chinese capital Beijing, announced a Chinese-sponsored agreement to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Riyadh formally severed ties with Tehran seven years ago. The countries’ effort to mend fences was public knowledge—Iraq and Oman had hosted previous rounds of talks between Iranian and Saudi officials—but China’s role in midwifing the accord was unforeseen, as was the speed with which the rapprochement proceeded. The degree to which the Joint Trilateral Statement issued by the three countries augurs a geopolitical shift that may see China assume a larger role in a region where the US has long been dominant remains important and yet to be seen.
The competing regional agendas of Riyadh and Tehran have compounded devastating wars in Yemen and Syria and continue to fuel instability in Lebanon and Iraq. Several Gulf Arab states have long been concerned about direct threats from, or even attacks by, Iranian proxies, as well as alleged Iranian support for dissident movements. From its side, Tehran accuses Saudi Arabia of backing ethnic opposition groups in Kordestan, Baluchistan, and other troubled provinces, along with hostile Iranian diaspora media.
Here, what may motivate these states to change their attitude towards Iran is the public opinion, which in most Arab states remains sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. If Arab governments explicitly support Israel in its war against the Palestinians, this could reduce the legitimacy of their leaders in the eyes of the public, though most pay the least attention to it.
Second, in the event of a wider war directly involving Iran, governments supporting Israel could be seen as aggressors. While the US has backed the security interests of Iran’s neighbours, there is no guarantee it always will.
Another reason is geographical proximity to Iran. Arab nations would not want an immediate neighbour to turn aggressive. A full-scale regional war would be a burden on their treasuries. Moreover, given Iranian ties to Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah—groups that pose real or perceived challenges to Arab governments—it is best not to explicitly take sides.
By not fully siding with Iran, some Arab nations have not yet fallen out of the good books of Israel and the West. Similarly, by not fully siding with Israel, some of them have not invited too much trouble from Iran either. Such a posture is a very diplomatic and tactical move to safeguard their national interests within a region in crisis.
However, an enlarged conflict in the Middle East might push the region to the brink with the risk of a direct confrontation between Iran and the United States. Indeed, restraint in the Middle East would align with US strategic interests. However, the clout of the pro-Israel lobby is undermining Washington’s decision-making.
The manner in which the US forces have been sent to Israel, along with the latest ammunition systems like the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence System (THAAD), might push Iran to bolster its deterrence by strengthening its offensive capabilities. Iran has warned it will change its nuclear doctrine if its existence is threatened.
Up until now, Iran’s broad security policy has included fostering close links with non-state actors in the region with shared interests. In 2003, Iran even told the US it would detach from Hamas and pressure Hezbollah to strictly operate as a political party in exchange for a removal of sanctions and an end to threats of regime change. But Tehran’s demands were never properly addressed. The Israeli actions against Iran’s top military commanders and Hamas leadership have further angered Iran. Such unilateral Israeli actions might force Iran to rethink its strategic doctrine. However, if Iran changes its defensive posture, it might raise concerns for Saudi Arabia despite the recent rapprochement between both sides.
Moreover, the Palestinian cause cannot be separated from the national and strategic interests of Middle East countries. Effective cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran has never been more urgent and it seems to be the need of the hour, and it seems that gears are moving in that direction. The lasting peace in the Middle East can only be established when the US government extricates itself from the influence of the pro-Israel lobby and rededicates itself to the preservation of global peace and the defence of human rights. This would not only the right thing to do, but also the historical responsibility that the US must embrace.