Amitava Mukherjee
(The author is a Kolkata-based senior journalist and commentator.)
Behind the gruff exterior, jingoistic Zionist Benjamin ‘Bibi’ Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, is also a romantic person. He has been married three times, and while his first wife, Mirium Weizmann, was pregnant, he began an affair with a British student named Fleur Cates. Soon, Mirium came to know of Netanyahu’s escapades and divorced him. He married Cates in 1981. In 1988, Cates divorced Netanyahu, sensing some other rats’ presence. Even his third, and the present, marriage had come under grave shadows. In 1993, Netanyahu confessed on live television to having had an affair with Ruth Bar, his public relations adviser. He also admitted that a secretly installed camera had captured him in a sexually compromising position with Bar. This again infuriated Sara, his present wife. But they compromised later on. So, each time Bibi survived the breakups, he reinvigorated himself for the days lying ahead.
So is his political career, too. Benjamin Netanyahu has survived many ups and downs in politics. But he did not fade away. His hawkish Zionist beliefs have always come into confrontation with the liberal outlook of the Labour Party. But Bibi failed to realise that the secular, multi-party democracy of Israel provided a shining exception to the Sheikhdoms all around. He also failed to realize that maintaining the secular character of the Zionist state is some sort of guarantee, albeit fragile, for its safety. True, the present ongoing war over the Gaza Strip is mostly the creation of the Hamas. No one can deny that Hamas is an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist gang, but it is also true that for years, the people of Gaza were throttled by some sort of blockade by Israeli authorities. Couldn’t Bibi do something to ease the situation?
Now Benjamin Netanyahu is riding a tiger. Everybody knows that Hamas is no match to Israel’s military might, and the Israeli Prime Minister did not indulge in exaggeration when he said, “Hamas started the war, and we will finish it”. Already, a large part of the Gaza Strip has been flattened by Israeli bombardment. But the all-important question is: what will Israel do with the Gaza Strip if and when it can root out Hamas, which is the former’s stated goal? Annexing the Gaza Strip will be a suicidal decision for Netanyahu. Joe Biden, the US President, has cautioned Tel Aviv on this point. So, if annexation is out of the question, what are the other options? There is still no sign that the Israeli cabinet has been able to formulate any idea about it.
If Netanyahu can really finish off Hamas, then his political future is secure, and he will come out stronger. That is what it should be. But history provides opposite examples as well. Take the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Egypt and Syria had dealt lethal surprises to Israel. The Egyptian army had crossed the Suez Canal and occupied its eastern bank, while Syria had pushed deep inside the Golan Heights. Israel counterattacked massively. The Israeli army had reached within 100 kilometres of Cairo and 32 kilometres of Damascus. But the first surprise to Israel dealt by Egypt and Syria pointed out the soft underbellies of the Israeli army. This cost Golda Meir, the then-Prime Minister of Israel, her political career.
A similarity with the present situation is easily detectable. About 1,000 Hamas terrorists had entered Israeli territories, butchered a large number of people, and taken others hostages. How could it happen with the famed Shin Bet and Mossad, the domestic and external intelligence wings of Israel, respectively, in existence? The answer lies in Netanyahu’s handling of internal and foreign policies. He has a penchant for remaining in power, which resulted in his stitching up a coalition government with extreme right fanatics of Jewish society as allies. Under his stewardship, Jewish society became torn apart. Its worst manifestation became evident when thousands of Israelis came out into the streets protesting against government measures to curb the judiciary’s independence. Both Shin Bet and Mossad were put into operation to contain or crush such anti-government demonstrations, derailing, in the process, both of these organisations from their actual duties.
The Middle East is really up for a change. Right at this moment, it is difficult to predict which way it will go. Hamas has played its card very badly. Although quite a few Middle East countries are now coming against the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, the reality is that they are maintaining backchannel connections with Tel Aviv. Both Egypt and Jordan have established diplomatic relations with Israel long ago. Interestingly, the grapevine has it that Egyptian intelligence had forewarned Israel about a probable attack by Hamas quite some time ago. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan followed suit and normalised relations with Tel Aviv through the Abrahamic Accord in the recent past. Even negotiations for normalisation are going on between Saudi Arabia and Israel. At present, Riyadh will put the negotiation process on hold. But that may be temporary.
But the Hamas misadventure has opened up many possibilities in world politics. A dicey factor on the chessboard is Iran. It has its strongest proxy in Hezbollah, which has firm bases in Lebanon and Syria. Although Hezbollah has received several beatings at the hands of Israel in recent times, its capacity to wage violent war cannot be underestimated. Hamas is also getting support from Iran. On the whole, support for the Hamas from regional Sheikhdoms is muted. Is it because the regional Sheikhs have not taken kindly to the open threat from Hamas leader Ismail Hanieyh, alluding inter alia to the fact that friendship with Israel will not be able to save them from Hamas’ wrath?
The Middle East scenario has another possibility. Will the United States again start putting a premium on its presence in the Middle East, which it had downgraded, so as to concentrate its attention wholly in the Indo-Pacific region? The possibility is there. This may reduce the importance of China in Middle East affairs. If, as a result of the Gaza war, Washington again turns its foreign policy focus on the Middle East, then not only the oil-rich states of the region but also the African countries will be a matter of contention between the US and China.
What will be the future of Gaza? The possibility is that the war will be a long and protracted one like that in Iraq. But ultimately, it will be very difficult for Hamas to hold on till the end. Here, Netanyahu will face a dilemma. The extremist right-wing faction of his coalition will press for outright annexation of the Gaza Strip. That will be an extremely foolish approach. The best way will be to place Gaza in the hands of an international administrative setup for quite some time and then ultimately hand it over to the Palestinian Authority, which now enjoys limited rights to civil rule in the West Bank.