Editorial

India’s ‘Eastern Discomfort’

A pall of suspense now hovers over the coming Bangladesh election. Since the birth of the nation in 1971, two countries—India and the United States—have always mattered in the minds of the Bangladeshi people.

Sentinel Digital Desk

Amitava Mukherjee

(The author is a senior journalist and commentator)

A pall of suspense now hovers over the coming Bangladesh election. Since the birth of the nation in 1971, two countries—India and the United States—have always mattered in the minds of the Bangladeshi people. Both countries had their respective roles during Bangladesh’s liberation war: India for her military intervention in support of the Bangladeshi liberation army and the US for its support of the genocide-committing Pakistani army. These two opposite pulls are in action as the Bangladesh election draws near.

No doubt, the US seems to be hyperactive in relation to the coming election. It has brought on restrictions on the granting of visas to Bangladeshi individuals (and their families too) responsible for or complicit in undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh. Its ambassador in Dhaka has called upon all the stakeholders to ensure a free and fair election. He has even met representatives of political parties for this purpose. A bit of an unnatural development, indeed! One reason may be the fact that Washington still views the Awami Legue as a left-of-centre party whose recent proximity to China is certainly a thorn in the side of America’s overall policy in the Indo-Pacific. Compared to the Awami League, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is a safer bet for the US in Bangladesh. Here, another thorn awaits the US. The BNP has close relations with the fundamentalist religious party, the Jamaat-e-Islami. Putting pressure on the Awami League government will embolden the Jamaat. How would the US reconcile Jamaat’s presence in the opposition segment?

This pattern has a history behind it. During the 1971 liberation war in Bangladesh, the US sided with Pakistan in opposing the Awami League-led freedom struggle. It was the Cold War period, and after the birth of independent Bangladesh, Mujibur Rahaman, the first Prime Minister of the country, was widely perceived to be under the influence of the then Soviet Union. Even his Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami League (BAKSAL) experiment, the one-party state system that he introduced in 1975, was modelled on the Bolshevik party-led government of the Soviet Union. Under Ziaur Rahaman, the founder of the BNP, who had become the President of Bangladesh after the violent overthrow of Mujib, Bangladesh quickly came out of the Soviet bloc tag and followed a pro-western state policy. During the stewardship of the BNP by Khaleda Zia, Ziaur Rahaman’s widow, not only did this pro-Western tilt become more pronounced, but Bangladesh became close to China as well.

The outcome of the Bangladesh election is sure to raise some concerns for India. It is not sure whether the BNP will participate in the election or not. Most probably, it will keep itself away from the process if its demand for a caretaker government is not met. India eagerly wants to see the Awami League win the election because the latter has an umbilical historical relationship with New Delhi, in spite of the fact that Hasina Wazed has opened her country to China in a big way. The return of the BNP-Jamaat combination to power will be nothing short of a nightmare for India because the former had, in the past, an overt and unabashed relationship with different Islamic fundamentalist outfits. It will also mean renewed support for various north-eastern Indian militant secessionist organizations.

So, New Delhi has reasons to be worried about the hyperactivity of the US in Bangladesh. According to official reactions from India’s Ministry of External Affairs, during the India-US 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue held this month, India shared its ‘perspective’ on the neighbouring country ‘very clearly’ with the US. Vinay Kwatra, India’s foreign secretary, expounded further: “The election in Bangladesh is their internal matter, and it is for the people of Bangladesh to decide their future”. It is a firm admonition to the US. According to sources, this has emboldened the Awami League, which was, even two or three months ago, not very sure about the strategic or diplomatic line India would take in the Bangladeshi electoral scenario.

The BNP did not take part in the 2014 election. It participated in the 2018 election. The results were disastrous. It accused the Awami League of massive rigging, which the latter denied. It is nobody’s case to say that elections in South Asian democracies are perfect. Electoral processes in Bangladesh also have their limitations. But the BNP is trying to paper over something, which is its fundamental structural limitation. From the time of Ziaur Rahaman, the BNP was basically dominated by a military/bureaucratic elite, while the Awami League had a mass character. Hasina Wazed has further extended this mass base through her overall satisfactory handling of the country’s economic sphere. While dealing with religious fundamentalists, she sometimes prevaricated, but it has to be admitted that this year’s Durga Puja festival in Bangladesh was trouble-free.

Bangladesh is very important to India’s overall foreign policy framework. But does India always feel comfortable with Hasina Wazed? Conversely, hasn’t Hasina experienced dejection vis-à-vis New Delhi’s Bangladesh policy discourse? The Teesta River water issue still stands unresolved. Hasina will have to face the electorate’s questions in this regard during electioneering. It has to be admitted that in spite of New Delhi’s gigantic contributions to the birth of an independent Bangladesh, India is still not viewed with favourable eyes by the hoipolloi of that country. India is aware of this phenomenon, and that is why Hasina Wazed was specially invited to Delhi before the last G-20 meeting, although Bangladesh is still not a member of that group.

Although India always looks forward to the Awami League’s victory in any Bangladesh election, beneath the veneer of camaraderie, uneasiness persists. This stems from the presence of China in Bangladesh and the opening of her country’s gate to Beijing by Hasina Wazed. In trying to sugarcoat the issue, Hasina recently said that Bangladesh has only economic relations with China, but her( Bangladesh’s) relations with India are umbilical. There are, however, clear signs that Dhaka is trying to create her own independent profile in international politics. This is quite natural for a sovereign nation, but both in India and in Bangladesh, it is sure to give the impression that Hasina Wazed is trying to come out of ‘decades-long Indian influence’.

To what extent does India consider Hasina Wazed a close ally in subcontinental politics? Here, many foreign policy planners in India prefer to keep their fingers crossed. Her father, Mujibur Rahaman, was certainly closer. Although the first Prime Minister of Bangladesh often showed panic reactions, like his decision to join the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), foreign policy experts will consider Mujibur to be a person whose heart is closer to New Delhi than that of her daughter.

During her tour in China in 2014, Hasina Wazed entered into various agreements with Beijing that were militarily uncomfortable for India. But after coming back to Dhaka, Hasina announced that she was prepared to condone China’s role during Bangladesh’s liberation war. (Like the US, China supported Pakistan when the latter was committing genocide in Bangladesh.) The purpose behind this was to get Chinese investments for Bangladesh. But it showed that she was prepared to compromise at the cost of history and morality.

If the BNP-led opposition comes to power( if the BNP fights the election at all), then India will have serious troubles on its eastern and north-eastern frontiers. If the Awami League retains power, then there will also be subterranean tensions. China is now Bangladesh’s largest arms supplier. Around eighty-two percent of Bangladesh’s total arms purchases come from China, while the corresponding figure for Pakistan, Beijing’s principal pawn in the South Asian strategic chessboard, is only 54 percent.

Does it send any message to Indian foreign policymakers? Surely it does. The eastern and north-eastern frontiers of the country present causes of headache for them. A thoughtful and more innovative policy push is necessary.