Amitava Mukherjee
(The author is a Kolkata-based senior journalist)
August 2023 will remain a memorable time in India’s recent history. The country’s moon The BRICS messagemission has experienced unqualified success. India landed her spacecraft at the Moon’s South Pole, where no other country has yet been able to leave its mark. Momentous turns have taken place in another arena where India is a stakeholder. In the 15th summit meeting of the BRICS held in Johannesburg, South Africa, the organization has decided to expand by admitting six new members: Argentina, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Ethiopia. The expanded organization may not turn out to be a game changer on the international geopolitical chessboard right now, but it has all the potential to bring about a qualitative turn in world politics.
There are now a plethora of international organizations – BRICS, G-7, G-20, etc.—that have replaced many of their predecessors. Big power-led blocs like NATO and the now-defunct Warshaw Pact were largely military alliances. But those representing the developing countries tried to leave a positive impact on world politics. Of the latter, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was the most important. SAARC came later on. But it did not have any ideological mooring like that of the NAM.
Where do we place the BRICS? Originally, it had big powers like China and Russia. Brazil, India, and the later entry, South Africa, provided the developing countries’ quota. In the beginning, it was structurally loose and lacked focus. It was more trade, finance, and development-related. But in neither of these fields could the BRICS contribute to any significant extent to any enhancement of trade and finance-related activities among its member countries.
Then how could the BRICS suddenly become a subject of great attention all over the world? The principal reason is a growing sense of opposition to a West-dominated post-Cold War unipolar world concept. Under the surface, opposition to the present system of world governance and the reigning liberal international order has gained ground. This can be directly attributed to the increasing ineffectiveness of the United Nations and an urge for reform of financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF.
The most important thing to note in the context of the latest expansion of the BRICS is that 40 countries had expressed their intention to be members of this organization, and 23 countries had formally applied for membership, knowing fully well that the BRICS is dominated by China and Russia, the two countries that are now said to be acting in unison in presenting a stout and combined opposition to the US-led international order.
Out of these 23 applicants, only six have been selected, and they are slated to join the organization in January 2024. But nothing is known about the criteria adopted for the choice. But the new composition is going to add some sort of bigger punch to the BRICS arsenal. Already, the BRICS countries represent 40 percent of the world’s population and one-fourth of the world’s gross domestic product. With the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, three oil- and gas-rich countries, it is expected that BRICS’ economic wherewithal will be enhanced, and its New Development Bank, a financial institution floated by the organization as an antidote to the World Bank and the IMF, will have more liquidity in its kitty for financing projects in member countries.
Overall, however, the political side of the expansion is more under the spotlight of the international media than its economic side. The presence of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE is likely to provide enhanced energy security to the member nations as well as raise the bargaining power of the BRICS. However, both the Saudi kingdom and the UAE have one of their roots rooted in the US camp, and they will continue to do so. But intriguing will be the activity of the other step, where China may have its influence.
Two geographical locations—the Middle East and Africa—are now under particular Chinese scrutiny, where Beijing is increasing its influence fast. Given this backdrop, the inclusion of Iran in the BRICS is the most important case, as it is now in direct confrontation with the US. It also signifies that China and Russia might try to hardsell a tough anti-US and anti-Western bloc policy for the BRICS. But the BRICS decision-making apparatus relies on consensus. It is widely believed that Brazil and India will not subscribe to such an approach, and New Delhi is an ally of the US in the Quad—to all intents and purposes, an anti-China platform in the Indo-Pacific.
So, Indian policymakers will have to be dexterous in guiding the country’s role in the BRICS in spite of the fact that a majority of the new entrants are New Delhi’s strategic partners. But China’s economy is more than double the size of all the other member states of the BRICS combined. So, New Delhi will have to be extra cautious while dealing with Beijing in the organization. But the Indian economy is also marching ahead at a brisk pace, and the United States, realizing fully well that the Chinese economy now equals almost 75 percent of that of the US, will leave no stone unturned to prop up India against China. Although this kind of future scenario will not be healthy for the BRICS, the possibility remains.
Another area of confrontation between the G-7 group of countries, led by the US and comprising countries like the UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Japan on the one side and the BRICS on the other, opens up in this context. The BRICS countries in total have slightly stronger purchasing power than that of the G-7 group of countries. But since the dollar is much more powerful than the respective currencies of the BRICS member countries, the G-7 group enjoys more power in several international forums. But the value of the dollar is declining, and in order to come out of its stranglehold, BRICS countries may start intra-BRICS trade in their respective currencies. Expansion of the organization may help in this respect.
In the days to come, the BRICS’ activities will be keenly watched by international power players. Closely watched will also be the stamp of China on it. The selection of new entrants throws some light on it. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran have entered into a new China-brokered relationship. The selection of Ethiopia is interesting. It is a fast-progressing economy, no doubt. But Nigeria has the bigger economy in Africa. However, both Nigeria and Kenya are said to be close to the US-led camp. Is it the reason for Nigeria’s exclusion? Why has Indonesia not been included?
But most interesting will be the case of Argentina. If available indications are to be relied upon, then there is a possibility that it may have a far-right and pro-US politician as the next president.
If that really happens, then will it match the BRICS’ overall approach?