Amitava Mukherjee
(The author is a senior journalist and commentator)
The victory of the People”s Democratic Party (PDP) in the recently held election of Bhutan and the anointment of Tsering Tobgay, its leader, as the Prime Minister of the country must have come as a relief for India after the recent setback New Delhi had to endure in the geo-political scenario of South Asia in the wake of the enthronement of pro-China Mohamed Muizzu as the President of the Maldives. The Chinese shadow over the eastern Himalayas presents a geo-political threat that is much more serious than what it is in the Ladakh sector. The reason lies in the fact that the last Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa (DNT) government in Bhutan, led by Lotay Tsering, dropped some oblong hints about its intentions to cosy up to China.
Beijing and Thimpu have been meeting for a long time to settle their boundary issues. The matter is intricate, and Thimpu cannot come to any settlement with Beijing as it is treaty-bound to consider India’s strategic interests. But some pronouncements of former Prime Minister Lotay Tsering were sufficient to raise consternations in New Delhi. Last year, while referring to the India-China dispute over the Doklam plateau, Tsering said, “It is not up to Bhutan alone to solve the problem. There are three of us. There is no big or small country; there are three equal countries, each counting for a third.” This is an indirect acceptance of China’s claim over the Doklam area, which India hotly challenges. However, through this interview, Lotay Tsering also indicated that there is very little possibility in the near future for any resolution of the dispute, as India would never agree to the presence of China in Doklam as this would mean a threat to the Siliguri corridor.
The reason for the conflict lies in the Chumbi valley, an arrow-like protrusion of a part of southern Tibet separating Bhutan from the Indian state of Sikkim. It is a trijunction of India, Bhutan, and Sikkim and is perhaps militarily the most important strategic point all along the Indo-China border. In 1962, India was fortunate in the sense that China did not push through the Chumbi Valley. Had it made a dash through the Chumbi Valley, then the situation would have been worse for India. The war would have been shorter in duration. Not only the fertile Assam plains but the entire state of West Bengal and the city of Calcutta would have been at the mercy of the People’s Liberation Army.
But there was a technical difficulty before China used the Chumbi Valley as a launch pad. The valley is narrow. There is not sufficiently wide horizontal space for making any massive military manoeuvres. At some places, it is only 30 miles wide. That is why China needs the adjoining Doklam plateau to make the Chumbi valley wider and fit for military operations. At the same time, Beijing’s depredations along Bhutan’s northern border are basically pressure tactics. China knows that Bhutan cannot easily succumb to its intentions, as it cannot but honour India’s geo-strategic interests. So Chinese pressures will go on mounting along Bhutan’s northern boundary until Thimpu agrees to what Beijing wants from it in the western sector, which includes Doklam.
There may be a more sinister design to China’s salami-slicing activities; it is perhaps pressuring the King of Bhutan himself by occupying areas in Beyul Khenpajong. The Bhutanese royal family traces its ancestral heritage to this mountainous region. Media reports, citing satellite imagery, have pointed out the growth of large Chinese settlements in this area capable of housing hundreds. A previous NDTV report said that it has counted more than 200 single- and multi-storeyed structures. China has staked claim to this region based on herders’ grazing activities.
Another area bearing the brunt of Chinese incursions is the Jakarlung Valley, which adjoins Beyul Khenpajong. According to Chatham House, China is constructing a settlement and an extensive road network in the Jakarlung Valley. NDTV had reported earlier that, as per Maxar images, at least 129 buildings in one settlement and more than 60 in another are coming up in Jakarlung. In the nearby Menchuma Valley, Chinese construction has also been noticed. Practically most of the Beyul, the entire Menchuma valley, and the lion’s share of the Jakarlung are now under Chinese occupation.
In such a scenario, Tsering Tobgay, the Harvard-educated technocrat with a degree in mechanical engineering and a master’s in public administration, becomes the new Prime Minister of Bhutan. He is reported to be a pro-India political figure. It will be intensely watched how he handles such a delicate situation, with China breathing heavily on Bhutan’s neck and pressing for diplomatic relations between the two countries.
“There is no question of a Chinese embassy in Bhutan,” Tsering Tobgay said in 2014, when he was the Prime Minister of Bhutan in an earlier stint. His will be perhaps the most interesting reign in the eastern Himalayas, as he is disagreeing with the Bhutan Monarchy’s concept of gross national happiness and instead laying stress on gross national product. He has reason to do so because Bhutan is experiencing a crumbling economy. In the last five years, the country’s economy has witnessed only 1.7 percent growth per year. Youth unemployment is staggering—nearly 29 percent. Large numbers of educated, unemployed young people are migrating to other countries. Bhutan needs money to tackle such a situation. Tobgay has three options before him: multilateral institutional aid and loans, aid and loans from India, and the same from China. Given his educational background in the United States and his pro-India proclivity, it is expected that Tsering Tobgay will not move towards any Chinese debt trap.
But Tobgay’s hands are also tied down. Bhutan has very little industry, and without industrial development, the country cannot provide employment to its youngsters. The country’s economic mainstay is hydropower generation and its exports. This alone cannot sustain a country’s economy. Moreover, the new Bhutanese Prime Minister may have to renegotiate with New Delhi the rate of the tariff on hydropower exported to India. Tobgay is also an environmentalist, and he has repeatedly emphasised the importance of forests to his country’s economy. How he puts his ideas into action in this sector will be closely watched.
Tsering Tobgay’s election as the Bhutanese Prime Minister is sure to give India a lot of manoeuvring space in the Himalayan region’s geo strategic scenario. For the first few months, New Delhi should wait and watch Tobgay’s policy decisions and then use her own leverage with him if needed.