Amitava Mukherjee
(amitavamukherjee253@gmail.com)
Where would you place Justin Trudeau, the Prime Minister of Canada, in relation to India’s foreign policy concerns? He is not like Vladimir Putin or Joe Biden. Putin has a completely opaque personality. It is very difficult to anticipate his chessboard moves. Biden is a more transparent character. But he lacks ideological moorings. You cannot juxtapose his presence with that of John F. Kennedy or even Richard Nixon. At present, there is hardly any leader in Europe to whom the liberal-democratic bloc can look up.
But New Delhi has reasons to be worried about the somewhat irresponsible profile that Justin Trudeau is trying to chalk out for himself. Everybody knows that pro-Khalistan elements have been getting sanctuaries in Canada for a long time. As the Prime Minister of the country, Trudeau had no business lending credibility to such elements by citing the oft-repeated cliche of ‘freedom of expression’. This is particularly confounding because Canada is now trying to be a player in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic and geoeconomic theatre and has identified India as an important factor in this arena.
Let us consider Canada’s evolving geostrategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Justin’s father, Pierre Trudeau, a long-standing former Prime Minister of Canada, was content with a low profile for himself and his country. In the 1960s and 1970s, very few of us were used to hearing about Canada in the vortex of world politics. Even now, the situation is not much different, with the exception that Canadian educational institutions have now become a sojourn for mediocre Indian students. So it is a bit inexplicable why Canada is interested in jumping on the American bandwagon in the Indo-Pacific in spite of the fact that China is its second-biggest trade partner.
Here is the underlying tension in Canada’s foreign policy initiatives, and Trudeau has been bungling in his attempt to manage it. He released his Indo-Pacific Strategy paper in November last year, which identified this particular region as the global centre of economic dynamism and strategic challenge. The fact is undeniable. The region has an economic machine like China. It has India, the largest populated country in the world. Vietnam has a fast-rising economy. It has the Asian Tigers—the booming economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. And finally, there are the ASEAN countries, not to mention some other big economies like Japan and Australia.
It remains to be seen how much importance Canada receives from big powers in Indo-Pacific affairs. But Canada has a high stake, as 1 in every 5 Canadians has family ties in this region, and it is also home to 60 percent of Canada’s international students. Therefore, Ottawa has declared India its ‘critical partner’ in the Indo-Pacific. But does India really look upon Canada as a responsible partner while opposing China in this region? Perhaps not. And if India-Canada bilateral relations veer to a bitter end, would it pose any security threat to New Delhi?
Yes, there is a bad omen, although it is not yet clear how much of a security threat the pro-Khalistan elements now active in Canada, the US, the UK, and Australia pose to India. However, unhindered pro-Khalistan demonstrations in these countries are sure to encourage secessionist forces in India. Here, Justin Trudeau’s immaturity has put paid to sour Ottawa-New Delhi bilateral relations. The cause celebra was the Punjab government’s decision to crackdown on the activities of Amritpal Singh, a Khalistan propagandist. It resulted in pro-Khalistan demonstrations and vandalism by disgruntled elements in front of Indian diplomatic missions in the above-mentioned countries. The most serious things happened in Canada, where threats of physical violence were hurled at Indian diplomats. A float was also taken out in a procession depicting Indira Gandhi’s assassination.
Expectedly, there were sharp reactions from India’s ministry of external affairs. The Canadian government professed its commitment to guaranteeing the security of India’s diplomatic staff and its opposition to violence and extremism. But behind this façade lies a stark reality. More than 3.5 percent of the Canadian population hails from India’s Punjab state. With his liberal approach to immigration, Trudeau has already enlisted their support. His Liberal Party, with only 157 seats, runs a minority government and is relying on the support of the New Democratic Party led by one Jagmeet Singh, alleged to be a supporter of Khalistan. There are three Sikh ministers in his cabinet. This is not to suggest that all the Sikhs in Canada are Khalistan sympathisers. In fact, anti-Khalistan protest marches are now being organised in Canada by responsible sections of the Sikh community.
Parliamentary support is one thing, and turning a blind eye to allegations of violence and extremism is another. True, Sikhs are now a deciding factor in a good number of urban constituencies. They can help Trudeau win elections. But softening the rising Khalistan threat from amongst a section of them can ultimately lead to a serious security threat for India. Justin Trudeau gave it the first fillip when he unnecessarily tried to poke his nose in the farmers’ agitation in India, opposing a host of the Central government’s propositions for reforms in the agriculture sector.
It will not serve much purpose by cataloguing Trudeau’s omissions and commissions in this respect. Suffice it to say that during his India visit in 2018, the Canadian Prime Minister and his wife were seen in the company of Jaspal Singh Atwal, a convicted Khalistani terroirist. In 2017, Trudeau attended a Khalsa Day celebration in Toronto, where the Khalistan flag was openly hoisted and banners with photographs of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale were displayed. All these had their reflections during Trudeau’s 2018 India visit, when he was openly snubbed by the Government of India.
This time too, New Delhi has taken a hard line. Various statements of the Indian foreign minister, S Jaishankar, point out this. Now it is to be seen how two particular big powers—the US and the UK—react. It can be said with a fair amount of certainty that the US will not stand by Canada on this issue. But UK is the unpredictable case. Now the important question is whether India would extend a helping hand to Canada on the Indo-Pacific issue.