Now Bhutan could be India’s biggest foreign policy worry

Amitava Mukherjee

(amitavamukherjee253@gmail.com)

It is better to admit that beneath the veneer of bonhomie, an air of mutual mistrust now permeates the Indo-Bhutan bilateral relationship. Lotay Tsering, the Prime Minister of Bhutan, has recently dropped hints of joint handling of the Doklam issue with India, China, and Bhutan as equal partners. In essence, this is a departure from the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, according to which both countries are obliged to cooperate with each other in matters of national security interest. But more ominous is Lotay Tsering’s denial of any Chinese intrusion into the Doklam plateau. Satellite images and media reports speak otherwise.

The Doklam plateau has high strategic importance in South Asia. It is an integral part of Bhutan and is situated on the eastern side of the Chumbi Valley, an arrow-like protrusion of a part of southern Tibet separating Bhutan from the Indian state of Sikkim. The Chumbi valley is very near the Siliguri corridor, called the Chicken’s Neck due to its long and narrow shape, which is India’s only gateway to its north-eastern part. Any Chinese push down the Chumbi valley and then control of the Siliguri corridor will cut off all north-eastern states of India and threaten the city of Kolkata also.

How does the Doklam Plateau fit into this strategic postulate? The Chumbi Valley may be an ideal launch pad for China for any invasion into India. For Beijing, it is more advantageous than the Panging Tso lake area or the Daulat Beg Oldi sector of Ladakh. But the Chumbi Valley has one strategic drawback as well. It is extremely narrow—only 30 miles wide in its narrowest stretch—for any military manoeuvre. If the abutting Doklam plateau, or a large part of it, can be incorporated into the Chumbi valley, then the problem is solved. In fact, this is what China is trying to accomplish in this area.

Significantly, Beijing has been upping its ante over the eastern Himalayas recently. Apart from the boundary negotiation issue with Bhutan, it has ‘renamed’ eleven more places in India’s Arunachal Pradesh a few days ago. China always links its Bhutan policy with that of Arunachal Pradesh. That is why it staked claims to Bhutan’s Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary, which adjoins the West Kameng and Tawang districts of Arunachal Pradesh. On the north-east side of this sanctuary is situated the Tawang monastery of Arunachal Pradesh, which is only second in importance for Tibetan Buddhism after the monastery of Lhasa.

In the past, China had never claimed the Sakteng sanctuary as a disputed area. Its recent claim over it might be a ploy to arm-twist Bhutan into agreeing to its demand in the western sector, which not only includes the Doklam but sundry other strategic areas like Charithang, Sinchulima, and the Dramana pasture lands. More significant things, casting their shadows on Doklam, have happened in Tibet. China has beefed up the Lhasa Gonggar airport, a base of the PLAAF, with an upgraded apron for accommodating more fighter aircraft, and to protect these aircraft from enemy missiles and bombs, their shelters have been strengthened.

Now the situation is such that India can no longer take Bhutan’s closeness to New Delhi for granted. Sushma Swaraj, a former foreign minister of India, had once tried to secure a verbal commitment from Bhutan in this respect, only to be indirectly rebuffed by her then Bhutanese counterpart. A more serious thing happened in the first decade of the present century when Bhutan’s official map did not show Kulakangri, the highest mountain peak of the country, indicating that the area had already been ceded to China.

The year 1966 had first witnessed Bhutanese protests over alleged Chinese intrusions into the Doklam and Thimpu’s entreaty with New Delhi for help. As the present Bhutan Prime Minister speaks of China as an equal partner in handling the Doklam issue, New Delhi should be wary of future developments.