Unravelling Pakistan: The perils of political, economic, and civil-military crises

Pakistan’s poly-crises—political, economic, and civil-military relations—continue unabated, though it is nothing new and is the only spike in scale and intensity of multiple crises
Unravelling Pakistan: The perils of political, economic, and civil-military crises
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Dipak Kurmi

(dipaknewslive@gmail.com)

Pakistan’s poly-crises—political, economic, and civil-military relations—continue unabated, though it is nothing new and is the only spike in scale and intensity of multiple crises. For the single-most critical factor of national stability and cohesion—the Army—it is possibly more significant than the military defeat in 1971, when on his return home, Lt. Gen. AAK Niazi was made to sit on a donkey and parade through his village. Or the taking out of Osama bin Laden in 2011 from under the very nose of the Army. For over two years now, the Army has been saying that it has no political role, although historically it has been deeply involved in propping up prime ministers—Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan, to name two.

The Deep State is a grand trinity of the Army, ISI, and jihadi Tanzeems. Current COAS, Gen. Asif Munir, is a former DG ISI appointed by outgoing COAS, Gen. Bajwa, over PM Imran Khan’s choice of Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed. Khan has called out Bajwa and Maj. Gen. Faisal Naseer as his would-be assassins. Given that the Army has managed to call the shots without direct rule, it is unlikely to declare martial law. Last Saturday, DG ISPR Maj Gen Ahmad Choudhary announced, “There is no question of imposing martial law”. After which Khan, rescued by the courts, tore into COAS and DG ISPR.

The likely internal divisions in the Army among the nine Corps Commanders have to be fixed, and any popular unrest over the future arrest of Khan has to be brought under control with a soft hand. The Army is the ultimate custodian of Pakistan’s core values and ‘atomi taakat’, its nuclear crown jewels. At present, the People’s Movement for Democracy—all political parties led by PML Nawaz, brother Shahbaz Sharif, and the Establishment—is opposed by Khan’s PTI and a divided Supreme Court. National elections are to be held in October.

Khan wants them held as soon as possible, as his party is expected to sweep them. The establishment wants elections minus Khan (in jail) to fix the outcome. For Khan to be put back in jail, the process has to be transparent and legal, as the courts indicated last week when they provided Khan with a reprieve until May 15 and bail for two weeks. This bit is not clear, as reports suggest that the Islamabad High Court gave him blanket relief in 145 cases against him.

Khan returned home to Zaman Park, Lahore, and a national broadcast blamed Gen Munir for his ‘abduction’ and tore into DGISPR. He asked his supporters to stage freedom protests on the weekend near their towns and villages. Hundreds of corruption cases have been levelled against him, and the ball is now in the government’s court—how to react to wholesale relief against 145 cases? The prolonged crisis had led to people storming military installations, including Mianwali Air Base, destroying the Chagai monument, the symbol of Pakistan’s nuclear power, and the Lahore Corps Commander’s residence. Some reports indicate the Corps Commander has been removed.

These crises come atop Pakistan’s worst economic situation when the IMF’s 25th loan—this time of USD 5 billion—is on hold, prompted by the US. Despite friends with deep pockets in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and China, there is a near-atta famine across Pakistan, with inflation shooting to 47 percent and the dollar at an all-time high of Rs 300. That’s why no one wants Pakistan to become a nuclear Somalia. Some five years ago, when I was in Tel Aviv for a counter-terrorism conference, we were taken deep into the desert to witness Iron Dome air defence firings. A senior IDF officer connected with Mossad confided that US and Israeli Special Forces have rehearsed contingency plans in these deserts to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar’s recent leaked pivot to China paper has only confirmed Pakistan-China iron-clad relations. Beijing is silent over Khan’s arrest, as it regards the military as the touchstone for internal stability. How the brutal assaults by Khan supporters on its institutional symbols will affect Beijing’s confidence in the military, one will not know. As for India, Pakistan has remained a troubling neighbour, with the 2003 ceasefire renewed in February 2022. The revocation of Article 370 by India will never be accepted by Pakistan, as Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto’s recent interview with an Indian TV channel during his SCO visit reveals. Two deadly terrorist attacks in Jammu over three weeks and probably more in store during the G20 tourism ministers’ meet in Srinagar later this month have revived hostility in bilateral relations.

Pakistan’s military has scores to settle with India over 1971 and Balakot. It has one confirmed ally, China, in this mission. India cannot wish away an internationally recognised UN-registered dispute over Kashmir, over which there are also bilateral agreements at Simla and Lahore. It’s time for India to wake up and smell the coffee. Meanwhile, it will be wrong on the part of many Indians to assume that a disturbed, divided, or disintegrated Pakistan is better than a stable Pakistan.

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