What does the Ukraine conflict mean for West Asia?

Talmiz Ahmad

(The author, a former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune)

PART-II

( Continued from yesterday)

Oil analysts have noted that, between them, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have spare capacity of more than 3 million barrels/ day and, given that total Russian oil exports are 5 mbd, they could easily bring down prices by just producing their spare capacity. However, Anchal Vohra, writing in Foreign Policy, has pointed out that Gulf rulers "no longer feel the need to be on the right side of the United States and are embracing newer alliances with like-minded authoritarians".

The challenge of food security

While political positions, engagements and alignments are being pursued among different actors in West Asia and North Africa (WANA), the dark cloud haunting the entire region is the threat to its food security. Russia and Ukraine together provide 40 per cent of the region's wheat imports; the dependence of some countries is even higher - 85 per cent in the case of Egypt, the world's biggest wheat importer, and 90 per cent in Lebanon. The conflict has exacerbated the existing problem of hunger - 55 million people in WANA experience hunger, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Human Rights Watch (HRW) have pointed out that Ukraine's Black Sea region, presently affected by the war, provides 12 per cent of food calories traded in the world; besides wheat, the country is also the leading global exporter of sunflower oil, barley, corn, rapeseed and poultry. On 9 March, Ukraine banned food exports to safeguard domestic interests, but, HRW says that, even when the conflict ends, supply disruptions will continue as the war has destroyed agricultural infrastructure and machinery, and several farmers have fled to safer places.

Linked with the disruption in food supplies is the problem of rising prices - in war-torn Yemen, Australia has quoted for wheat supplies at $600/ tonne, as against the pre-war Ukrainian price of $255/ tonne. Given the sensitivity of food prices in a country where a third of the population is below the poverty line, in Egypt, the staple flatbread is heavily subsidized, with consumers paying just a tenth of the production cost: the annual subsidy on bread is $3.2 billion; in the financial year 2021-22, the additional cost will be nearly $700 million.

Compounding food issues in WANA is the fact that major countries in the region are experiencing poor harvests due to drought, perhaps brought on by climate change. The US Department of Agriculture has projected that Iran, Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt will together need to increase their grain imports in 2021-22 to 35.5 million tonnes, i.e., 17 per cent of the world total, as against 25.9 million tonnes in the previous year, or 13 per cent of the total.

Not surprisingly, given that the Arab Spring uprisings a decade ago were triggered by a regionwide economic crisis, some commentators are suggesting that Ukraine could aggravate popular discontent; though this might not evolve into angry agitations for change, (perhaps because the experience of the pandemic has made people more stoic), there will be fresh pressures on governments to attend to popular interests, beyond the concerns brought on by matters related to security and strategic interests.

Outlook for WANA

A month after the commencement of the Ukraine war, the principal feature of politics in West Asia has been the attempts of the principal regional states to maintain a balance between the US and Russia, basing their position variously on "strategic diversity", "strategic selfishness" or just plain hedging. Despite considerable US pressure and behind-the- cajolery, none of the states concerned has rushed to the US embrace - an extraordinary exhibition of independence of action.

What the region has witnessed has been a flurry of interactions - with national leaders sitting in bilateral and even trilateral conclaves to exchange views and assessments. Their most immediate concerns relate to the Ukraine war and the JCPOA and, related to that, Iran's role in regional affairs. The most interesting conclave has been the one that brought together Egypt, the UAE and Israel at Sharm el-Sheikh, but, before the Ukraine conflict, we had seen Iraq, Jordan and Egypt announcing an economic and political partnership, while Iran could still bank on its support bases in Syria and Iraq, even though the latter was wearing thin under popular pressure.

The third feature of regional affairs is the long-term value that each regional player attaches to ties with Russia and China: based on the solid foundations of energy, trade, investment and logistical connectivity initiatives, for each country, these ties have begun to include a strategic content - increasing dialogue on political matters and expanding defence ties. These relations, taken together, constitute a significant change from a few years ago when the US was the sole go-to partner for most regional states.

Commentators are generally baffled about the shape of things to come. Most suggest, somewhat lazily, that the present-day assertions of autonomy by regional states will be short-lived and they will fairly soon re-join the US alliance. This assessment has misread the powerful signals emanating from national capitals - West Asia has truly changed; the US will not find in the region the unthinking support for its approaches, most of which had earlier obtained reluctant backing even when they were harmful to regional interest and pursued against regional counsel.

The Ukraine war has not created a new regional order; it has ensured that it is strengthened - and regional players pursue their interests independently and confidently. (IANS)

( Concluded)