China tightens the noose around Taiwan with air and sea blockade

In response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s stopover in California and meeting with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy on April 5, China upped the ante with a series of military aircraft manoeuvres designed to psychologically intimidate Taiwan.
China tightens the noose around Taiwan with air and sea blockade

HONG KONG: In response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s stopover in California and meeting with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy on April 5, China upped the ante with a series of military aircraft manoeuvres designed to psychologically intimidate Taiwan.

Beijing’s response to the meeting was muted at first, promising “joint inspection patrols” by a Maritime Safety Administration vessel. This was followed by two live-fire exercises off the coast of Pingtan and Fuzhou. As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ramped up pressure against Taiwan, the Eastern Theater Command announced a large-scale exercise from April 8-10.

On the first day, a large number of aircraft - including H-6K strategic bombers and a Y-20U tanker - crossed the Taiwan Strait median line and entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) in the southwest.

The next day, J-15 fighters from the Shandong aircraft carrier entered Taiwan’s ADIZ for the first time ever. KJ-200 airborne early-warning aircraft entered for the first time too. In fact, 259 PLA aircraft provocatively entered Taiwan’s ADIZ in the month of April.

This was an increase of 184 compared to April last year, and it was actually the second-highest total ever (the highest being 446 aircraft in August 2022, the same month that Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei). The highest single-day total of aircraft violations was 10 April with 54 aircraft.

Significantly, this was the second-highest daily figure ever. Most aircraft were fighters (the most common was the J-10), but 20 different types of PLA airframes joined April’s violations.

China has already established a pattern of tightening the screws whenever it views a Taiwanese action with displeasure. It has a range of instruments at its disposal, but military coercion seems to be becoming far more prominent.

Salami slicing and grey-zone tactics are China’s regular modus operandi, but its actions are becoming ever more robust and blatant as China narrows Taiwan’s room for manoeuvre and psychologically bludgeons it.

There are more overt measures in its toolkit that China has not yet taken. Seizing outlying islands such as the Pratas would enable China to extend control over territory held by Taiwan.

Yet this would be a higher risk than what China did in the South China Sea when it militarized unoccupied low-lying reefs and turned them into bases. Other potential actions include cyberattacks and targeting civilian infrastructure.

Far more violent would be missile bombardments or maritime, air and information blockades. Beijing could use them to force Taiwanese leaders to the negotiating table, or to set conditions for a military invasion. The ultimate military option for China would be a full-scale amphibious invasion.

However, there are only a few beaches in Taiwan where such landings are possible, and only certain times of the year when the waters of the Taiwan Strait are sufficiently calm.

The best bet for Taiwan is therefore to try and control access to the air and water around Taiwan to keep Chinese troops at arm’s length. Contrary to Russia’s overland invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan would rely upon air and sea denial using anti-ship missiles and naval mines, whereas Kyiv relied on tanks and artillery to repel Russia’s ground invasion.

After watching the conflict play out in Ukraine, Taiwan will prioritize equipment like coastal defence missiles, drones, electronic jammers, missile-equipped boats, loitering munitions, communication satellites and mine-laying ships.

These all contribute to a “porcupine strategy”, the idea being to sharpen Taiwan’s quills to make it more painful and costly for China to eat the porcupine.

Taiwan will also have learned the importance of stockpiling munitions, increasing resilience, self-sufficiency, keeping supply and communications lines open, and the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare. There is a greater sense of urgency in Taiwan’s establishment, and it knows it must better defend itself. (ANI)

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Sentinel Assam
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