Hasina Wazed: Key figure in India's foreign policy initiative

Amitava Mukherjee

(Amitava Mukherjee is a senior journalist and commentator.

He can be reached at amitavamukherjee253@gmail.com)

Hasina Wazed, Prime minister of Bangladesh, is a slightly misunderstood person among Indian foreign policy makers and media pundits. Indian media had underscored its anxiety over the 'sudden strains' in Indo- Bangladesh relations as HarshaVardhan Shringla, the Indian Foreign secretary, had made a sudden visit to Dhaka last month. The visit was extraordinary no doubt as it was made at a time when corona virus is enjoying a field day in both India and Bangladesh. Certainly there is something in the air which has made New Delhi uneasy. Be that as it may, misunderstanding Hasina Wazed will be a big mistake.

Sounding the caution has become necessary because certain signs of nervousness are noticeable among Indian policy makers. Two recent developments have worked behind it. First after a phone call between Hasina Wazed and Xi Jinping, President of China, Beijing has decided to allow 97 per cent of Bangladeshi exports to China under a duty free programme. As a result 8256 numbers of Bangladeshi items will enter China without giving any tax. Secondly Imran Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, has recently called Hasina Wazed to express his willingness for a steady and improved relations between the two countries.

Given the recent state of Indo-China relations, New Delhi needs to remain cautious at Beijing's overtures to Dhaka but should not go off balance. There is no need for consternation at Beijing's friendly overtures or Imran's tete-a-tete with the Bangladesh Prime Minister. Hasina's father Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman's closest ally was India. But that did not prevent Mujibur from accepting membership of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) during his lifetime. Secondly the old South Asian axis of Soviet Union-India-Bangladesh ceased to exist with the dismemberment of Soviet Union. Maintaining relations with China is now necessary for Bangladesh for a balance in its foreign policy.

However, that does not mean that India needs to keep no watch on Bangladesh's foreign policy initiatives. Far from it. In 2014 Hasina expressed herself in a horrible manner on the question of Sino-Bangladesh relationship. After coming back from a trip to Beijing she said that Sino-Bangladesh relation is not only a matter of close comprehensive relationship of cooperation but it is a dynamic process which has metamorphosed from the stage of economic partnership to the realm of strategic partnership. The actual bombshell came along with this statement on strategic shift. In her first press conference in Dhaka after her return from China Hasina said that she is prepared to forget the past in the interest of economic benefits for her country, a clear allusion to China's hostile attitude to the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971 and her willingness to forge closer ties with China.

Perceptive analysts would agree that Hasina Wazed is a split personality. She always feels the umbilical relations which she herself, her family and the Awami League have with India. But in some corners of her mind the Bangladesh Prime Minister is torn by a divided loyalty- loyalty to the concept of Bengali nationalism and an allegiance to the much publicized idea of Bangladeshi nationalism. Although the theory of Bangladeshi nationalism was first propounded by Ziaur Rahaman, a former President of Bangladesh and an arch enemy of the Awami League, yet the daughter of Mujibur Rahaman often comes under its spell and its manifestation takes the shape of her sudden but unsteady tilts towards China.

An ideal example of it was the proposal to build a deep sea port at the Sonadia Island near Cox's Bazar with Chinese investments and technology. It would have given China an excellent military base to keep watch on the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean through which pass most of China's energy supply from the Persian gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Protests came from the United States and India. Bangladesh hurried back from its half-hearted decision. Although Bangladeshi mandarins unofficially cite the example of Sri Lanka falling into the Chinese debt trap over the Hambantotta port, yet they confirm in the same breadth that Dhaka does not want to get entangled in South Asian geostrategic rivalry. If that be the case, then why did Dhaka choose China as a partner at the first instance? There is no satisfactory answer. Instead another deep sea port will be built at a place named Matarbari in the same Cox's Bazar district with Japanese finance and technological help. This split mentality is again the reason behind Beijing-Dhaka military relations. China is now the largest arms supplier to Bangladesh. While Chinese weaponry accounts for 54 per cent of total Pakistani arms purchase, the corresponding figure for Bangladesh is 82 per cent.

Many observers feel that Bangladesh's recent tilt towards China is a result of India not agreeing to share Tista river waters as demanded by Dhaka. This is not correct because Dhaka's occasional attempts to come close to Beijing actually started from 2010 when the Tista controversy was not in sight. In fact Bangladesh uses the China card in a haphazard manner and this shows that the country does not have any clear-cut neighbourhood policy. Hasina's continued refusal to give appointment to Riva Ganguly Das, Indian ambassador, should be seen in this light. Some Bangladeshi writers have tried to pass it off as a necessary precaution on the part of the Prime Minister not to meet any foreigner in the midst of Corona outbreak. But this argument lacks solid legs to stand upon.

Hasina's off and on attempts to curry favour with China have some practical reasons. Bangladeshi economy lacks in diversification. Garment exports cannot sustain it in any significant manner. Therefore, Dhaka needs foreign investments in the form of project finances. This will open up the avenue of import duty taxation and various other direct and indirect taxes. Although a hype has been generated about Bangladesh's growing GDP, yet the picture is not that rosy. In 2019-2020 it has borrowed from the banking industry more than what its total loans for the last 49 years figure out. Since China has a huge hard currency reserves, Bangladesh finds its involvement in infrastructural projects more lucrative.

But Awami League as a political party has deep relations with India. It is true that the present Indian bureaucracy does not have the insight or a personal reach to Bangladeshi politicians which a P.N. Haksar, a T.N. Kaul or a Muchkund Dubey had. Moreover, India has been found to be lethargic in completing various infrastructure projects in Bangladesh. If such loopholes can be plugged then there is not much cause of worry for any Beijing-Dhaka bonhomie.