India-China relations: Tibet’s enduring impact on Modi’s strategic calculus

Dipak Kurmi

(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)

In March 2018, during its first term, Narendra Modi’s government issued an unexpected directive to senior political figures and officials across all ministries, advising them to avoid attending events organised by the Tibetan leadership in India. These events were intended to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile. The directive, issued by the then Cabinet Secretary, cited a “sensitive time” for India-China relations as the reason. Just two months later, Modi would visit Wuhan in China for an “informal dialogue” with Chinese President Xi Jinping, seeking to move past the Doklam crisis.

Six years later, recent signals from Delhi to Beijing regarding the Tibet issue reflect how Prime Minister Modi, currently in his third term but politically more vulnerable, might be strategizing his approach to relations with Beijing. These relations have been strained since the Chinese incursion into eastern Ladakh in 2020.

The June 19 meeting in Dharamsala between the Dalai Lama and a bipartisan US Congressional delegation wasn’t the first instance of a high-level US team visiting the Tibetan leader in Himachal. Since 2000, nearly every US administration’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs has made this journey, with Delhi consistently facilitating these visits. In contrast to previous low-profile visits, the recent delegation, composed entirely of prominent political figures such as former Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi and House Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairman Michael McCaul, turned the June 19 meeting into a highly publicized event.

The timing, just days after PM Modi’s swearing-in, was likely deliberate. In the US, a bipartisan bill aimed at “promoting a resolution of the China-Tibet conflict” passed the House of Representatives on June 12, completing its congressional journey. Since the introduction of the Resolve Tibet Act in 2022, China has fiercely opposed it, viewing it as a threat to its sovereignty. This legislation, now awaiting presidential approval, was the focal point of the delegation’s meeting with the Dalai Lama.

China’s expected criticism of the US delegation’s visit notably avoided mentioning Delhi. However, Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with the delegation after their return from Dharamsala is perceived as a bold message to Beijing. According to official statements and reports, the discussions focused on India-US relations, with no public mention of China. Group photos from the event featured Modi flanked by Pelosi and, more significantly, from Delhi’s perspective on US relations, the influential McCaul.

The Ministry of External Affairs reiterated India’s long-standing policy in its statement on the event, emphasising that the Dalai Lama is a “revered religious leader” who is “accorded due courtesies and freedom to conduct his religious and spiritual activities.” This reaffirmation underscores India’s consistent stance on the matter.

Delhi consistently refrains from identifying the Dalai Lama as a political leader of the Tibetan people, instead referring to him respectfully as His Holiness. Similarly, it avoids calling the Tibetan political setup a “government-in-exile,” opting for the term Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), which it engages with for managing routine matters concerning the Tibetan community in India. Although Tibet remains a contentious issue in India-China relations, Beijing has begrudgingly accepted this framework, especially after India’s 2003 reaffirmation during then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of China.

While the fundamental stance remains unchanged, there is a subtle shift evident—a distinction between policy and messaging that experts often highlight, with the latter allowing for flexibility. Since 2003, when a joint statement during Vajpayee’s visit affirmed that India “does not permit Tibetans to conduct anti-China political activities” on its territory, Delhi’s approach has evolved. This evolution is illustrated by recent actions, such as facilitating a prominent US delegation’s visit to Dharamsala, which subtly challenges Beijing’s sensitivities.

Since 2009, India has refrained from explicitly endorsing the One China policy in its official statements, notably omitting any reference to Tibet during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit in 2010. Delhi’s stance then underscored its concerns over Chinese activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, the issuance of stapled visas to Kashmiris, and its assertiveness regarding Arunachal Pradesh. This position was reiterated by Sushma Swaraj in 2014, shortly after assuming office as External Affairs Minister under the new Modi government. Notably, both the Taiwan representative in Delhi and the president of the Central Tibetan Administration attended Modi’s inaugural ceremony.

Within a year, amidst the Doklam crisis, Modi’s initial efforts to enhance relations with China led to a distancing from the Dalai Lama. However, as tensions escalated along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) a year into the crisis, Modi shifted his approach once more. In a significant reversal since 2015, he publicly acknowledged the Tibetan leader by calling to convey birthday wishes in 2021, and also shared these sentiments on social media. Subsequently, this gesture has been reciprocated annually, marking a notable evolution in their interactions.

In 2024, Modi faces a new political landscape where the BJP relies not only on the NDA but also contends with a robust opposition in Parliament. Over the past four years, the government has dismissed Congress’ calls for transparency regarding the situation in eastern Ladakh at the LAC. Avoiding scrutiny is no longer feasible. Whether India was coerced into facilitating the US congressional visit or not, it provided Modi with an early opportunity to visibly signal a stance towards China. This move came shortly after Beijing rebuked him for accepting felicitations from the Taiwan President, underscoring India’s response. Beijing’s delayed and lower-ranking congratulatory message from Premier Li Qiang, rather than President Xi, further highlighted tensions. Yet, amidst these signals, the crucial question remains: Is there a strategic plan guiding these actions beyond mere gestures?

According to Jabin Thomas Jacob, a China expert at Shiv Nadar University, India has shouldered the burden of hosting the Dalai Lama for an extended period without reaping corresponding benefits from China. He argues that it is now imperative for the government to clarify its Tibet policy, including its stance on the succession of the Dalai Lama. This call is heightened by ongoing tensions along the LAC and the unresolved boundary issues, which are intricately linked to the Tibet question.

Meeting the Dalai Lama has proven elusive for Modi thus far. Their last public encounter predates his tenure as Prime Minister, with a discreet 2015 meeting kept confidential by the government, much to the frustration of Tibetan leaders. As Modi enters his third term, navigating China remains his paramount foreign policy challenge. The Tibet issue only complicates matters further, adding another layer of complexity to India’s diplomatic strategy.