India’s defense strategy: Urgent need for increased investment and reforms

Dipak Kurmi

(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)

India faces twin challenges that necessitate an active deterrence strategy,
achievable through significant defense investment. The BJP’s defense and national security manifesto are framed as Modi’s guarantee for a secure India. Launching an extensive 15-day campaign, the party sought suggestions from about 10 million supporters through face-to-face meetings and the NaMo app. The manifesto is heavily adorned with images of Modi and his numerous guarantees, boasting several accomplishments.

Despite the BJP’s claims, terrorism persists, with recent attacks in Jammu and Kashmir. Cross-border terrorism has a grim history, with the Parliament attack in December 2001 (under BJP rule) and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 under the UPA government. In 2001, the BJP employed coercive diplomacy through Operation Parakram, which was partly successful. Conversely, in 2008, the UPA’s strategic restraint resulted in inaction. The BJP’s zero-tolerance stance on terrorism is exemplified by the surgical strikes in Uri and Myanmar in 2016 and the Balakot airstrikes in 2019, creating deterrence against major terrorist activities. However, the BJP’s assertion of no attacks in the past decade is inaccurate; incidents at Pathankot, Pulwama, and Uri Brigade Headquarters, along with 2,950 deaths in terrorist-related incidents between 2014 and 2023, contradict this claim.

The BJP’s achievements include the revocation of Article 370 and a 52% reduction in left-wing extremism, with Home Minister Amit Shah predicting its eradication within three years. There’s been a 73% decline in northeastern insurgency, yet the ongoing violence in Manipur, which has seen repeated re-polling, is a significant embarrassment for the government and could reignite insurgency. The volatile India-Myanmar border, where the Junta faces rebel forces, poses a major threat to the Northeast.

The BJP hails the establishment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as a significant achievement, pushing for swift completion of its theorization. Infrastructure development along the northern borders aligns with a focus on securing the Indian Ocean Region. Defense manufacturing and self-reliance under the ‘Make in India’ initiative are emphasized, yet there’s no mention of China or Pakistan, despite opposition criticism over lost territory in eastern Ladakh—a claim the government denies. Resolving the border dispute with China on India’s terms seems unlikely, and restoring the pre-April 2020 status quo, as demanded by successive Army Chiefs, is also unfeasible. A lack of political guidance for the Armed Forces remains a critical shortcoming, although Defence Minister Rajnath Singh recently indicated progress towards an agreement on theorization after four years.

Leaving the task to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), whose operational role remains ambiguous, to gain consensus on resource allocation, defining the service chiefs’ job profiles once theatre commanders are established, and managing operational command and control of theatres is impractical without input from the Defence Minister (RM) and the National Security Advisor (NSA) to the CDS. NSA Ajit Doval and the National Security Council Secretariat also need to update the National Security Strategy (NSS) that the Integrated Defence Staff submitted in 2021. Surprisingly, the government has not given these two interconnected issues—theatrization and NSS—the attention they deserve. There is widespread speculation that these matters will be addressed within the first year of the BJP’s third term. During the UPA administration, the NSS was drafted three times. The most perplexing issue is stagnant defence spending, which the BJP’s 2024 manifesto does not address.

The Congress, in its current manifesto, has pledged to halt the decline in defence spending and ensure adequate funding. Addressing the sufficiency of defence funds is a challenge that no government has effectively tackled so far.

During the late 1980s under Congress rule, defence allocation peaked at 3.5 percent of GDP, a period when I was part of the Defence Planning Staff. Today, despite significant GDP growth, defence spending has dropped to below 2 percent. The latest SIPRI report highlights that India’s defence budget stands at USD 84 billion, in stark contrast to China’s USD 296 billion. For the 2024–25 period, the defence outlay increased by only 4.7 percent, marking the lowest rise in a decade (except for 2020–21), with spending at just 1.45 percent of GDP. Despite ongoing conflicts and numerous skirmishes, defense spending has not reached 2 percent of GDP.

The capital budget for modernization starkly illustrates this frugality: in 2015-16, the gap between the requested and allocated funds was Rs 16,646 crore, which ballooned to Rs 63,328 crore by 2022–23. Government officials frequently excuse this by claiming that the defense forces are unable to utilize the funds. Amit Cowshish, a former financial advisor (Acquisition), points out that the current defense budget, at 1.9 percent of GDP, constitutes 13 percent of government expenditure. To begin catching up with China’s military capability, defense spending would need to be raised to at least 3 percent of GDP.

Globally, nations are significantly ramping up their defense investments. The 31 NATO members have committed to allocating 2 percent of their GDP to defense, with the UK aiming for 2.5 percent by 2027. Even Japan, traditionally pacifist, plans to surpass its constitutional 1 percent defense spending limit, targeting 2.5 percent of GDP by 2027 and investing USD 315 billion to enhance its capabilities and deterrence. India must consider the capital costs of theaterization and related reforms. Modi needs to take decisive action to deter China and, alongside Jaishankar, aim to transform the twin threat challenge into a one-front issue. The notion that “this is not the era of war” is unrealistic and overly optimistic.