Is Israel succeeding in Gaza?

DC Pathak

(The writer is a former Director of the Intelligence Bureau. Views are personal)

In these nine months of its air and ground operations in Gaza in response to the terror attack of Hamas on October 7 last year, Israel has forcibly displaced 80 percent of the population there, killed over 37,000 people, including a large number of Palestinian women and children, and dropped as many bombs in the region as the total of those thrown on Europe in World War II.

The military action of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) against Hamas not only raises the issue of disproportionate collateral losses in an army action but also questions the basic strategy of effectively countering terrorist organizations, itself.

It is true that Hamas practising terrorist methodology is also a military outfit that combined the tactics of first unleashing an open missile attack and then using it as a cover to infiltrate across the Israeli border to resort to indiscriminate firing with automatic rifles, killing a large number of civilians—nearly 1200—who were participating in Israel's Memorial Day function nearby. In the brutal offensive, Hamas took away nearly 250 hostages, mostly women and children. Israel, as a democratic state, was fully justified in taking a military response to punish Hamas, but its action has over time been reduced to the blind destruction of civilian areas and establishments where the Hamas militants were expected to be taking shelter in the underground tunnels.

Even in situations where two rival armies confront each other, a certain amount of civilian casualties might occur as unavoidable collateral damage, but in Gaza, the IDF went all out against the invisible enemy hidden behind non-combatant civilians—women and children included—and in the process extensively bombed the residential areas.

It is possible that many of the civilians were actively supporting Hamas; the October 7 attack on Israel sent down a wave of excitement and appreciation across Palestine. They might even be sheltering Hamas militants, thus running the risk of inviting punitive action at the hands of the Israeli army, but the stand of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Hamas would be eliminated even if the IDF had to destroy the entire Gaza that was instrumental in providing a cover to the terrorists would surely lead to adverse political consequences for him in his own country as well as in the international community.

Counter-terror operations have to be intelligence-based, particularly where the Army is used for them, because the unseen enemy would only be eliminated when his identity and location were known; heavy armament was no guarantee of their success.

As matters stand, the devastation of civilian life and property in Israeli military action is only helping to spread support for Hamas not only in the Muslim world but elsewhere too. A terrorist force thrives on presenting itself as a "victim" of retaliatory action, even though it might have caused the initial provocation, because it ultimately banks on the battle of perception and draws advantage from the loss of innocent lives in any counter-terror operations.

In the case of Israeli operations, the scale of destruction has attracted the attention of the entire world. It cannot be explained away by the natural differential that exists between the damages caused by a "covert" terror attack and an "open" military offensive. The blame for this large asymmetry in the loss of human lives is being passed on to Israel, notwithstanding the fact that the Hamas terror attack of October 7 was a planned one that was not forgivable at all.

Over decades, Israel has lived a life of constant threat to its very survival, and the history of Israel-Arab hostilities, attributable largely to the refusal of many Arab states to even accept the right of Israel to exist, did justify an extreme national sensitivity on the part of Israeli rulers about putting up with any treacherous offensive from its opponents.

Of course, valid questions have been raised about the competence of Israeli intelligence in regard to the October 7 attack by Hamas, particularly in light of the fact that thousands of Palestinians came to Israel for their daily occupation, and some "listening posts" for Israel were expected to exist among them.

Before the current Israel-Hamas confrontation broke out, there were some moves towards bringing about an Arab-Israel detente. Some members of the Arab League—the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—had shown an inclination towards normalising relations with Israel and accepted the idea of the Abrahamic accord at the prompting of the US. Even Saudi Arabia, with its extreme Sunni fundamentalism, appeared set to honour the proposition.

The new conflict between Israel and Hamas has given a setback to this thinking. Human suffering and the loss of innocent lives—of women and children in particular—are creating an aversion towards Israel among people everywhere.

Arab opinion is evidently turning not only against Israel but against the US as well. What is extremely significant is that Arab thinking has started tilting favourably towards China, and this can sharpen US-China rivalry in the Middle East; this divide is already showing up elsewhere across the globe. The negativity of the terror profile in the build-up and working style of Hamas is getting pushed to the background as the religious contradiction between Islam and Zionism is coming to the fore in the aftermath of the current Israel-Hamas conflict and affecting the entire Muslim world.

Ayatollah's rule in Iran was politically inimical towards the US and Israel, and this hostility had made Iran side with Hamas, notwithstanding the fact that Sunni Islamic radical forces considered both the US and the 'deviationist' Shiites as their prime enemies. Iran's political opposition to Israel as a rival in the Middle East guides its responses. Iran has set upon Israel its proxies—Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Yemen-based Houthis—and reached out to China and Russia, the political adversaries of the US and Israel.

Islamic radicals from ISIS are active in Syria. Iraq and their regional outfit called ISIS-K carried out an attack in March this year on a concert on the outskirts of Moscow, causing the deaths of 130 people and injuries to many others. They had a grouse that Russia supported Syrian President Bashar Al Assad—an Alawite—against their staunch opposition to him.

One outcome of the Israel-Hamas confrontation that should cause real concern to the entire democratic world is that it had the potential to push the global order towards faith-based conflicts, even as there were already signs of the reappearance of a wider Cold War between the US-led West and the China-Russia axis.

Religion-driven alignments seem to be further bolstering this global divide. Iran coming closer to China and Russia, the Taliban-led Kabul Emirate striking a give-and-take adjustment with China, and the Arab world siding with Hamas against Israel because of the basic contradiction between Islam and Zionism—these are all trends that signified the importance of religion as the fundamental driving force of unity overriding political differentiations.

China under President Xi Jinping is striving to become a superpower on the strength of economic growth and technological advancement—though its military might is also being built—and is playing its cards in the Ukraine-Russia armed confrontation in a manner that would keep Russia on his side without letting the conflict acquire the dimensions of a world war.

The Middle East is setting an example of how regional conflicts may be determining the cause of global peace and how regional interests could be guiding the approach of world powers to such conflicts.

The world opinion is against nuclear confrontation, which further helps the play of the old doctrine of'mutually assured destruction’ as a deterrent against any move of ‘first strike’. As a result, international conflicts driven by religion seem to be affecting the global scene of our times more than the possibility of a revival of the Cold War.

India is in the midst of a foreign policy challenge because the new geopolitical shifts have had the effect of causing a reset of the strategy of handling international relations.

India's emphasis on mutually beneficial bilateral relationships that do not compromise with the case for global peace and human welfare has proved to be extremely fruitful, as it has enabled India to develop a natural friendship with the US as a leader of the democratic world without letting this affect the strategically deep India-Russia bonds. It has made it possible for India to demand upfront that the Ukraine-Russia military confrontation be paused to allow for mediation for peace on the basis of an understanding of the security concerns of both sides.

A second element of India's foreign policy has been an unambiguous condemnation of terrorism of any kind or origin. This covers Pakistan's cross-border terrorism in Kashmir carried out by Pak ISI-sponsored Islamic militant outfits like Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkare Toiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad that were India-specific, to which had been added the Islamic 'radical' forces like Al Qaeda and ISIS that were increasing their hold in the Muslim world and reaching out to other regions globally.

On a visit to Moscow for the India-Russia bilateral summit with President Vladimir Putin on July 9, Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned the recent ISIS-K attack in Moscow and pointed out how India had for long suffered Pak-instigated cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere.

India had denounced the October 7 terror attack by Hamas on Israel, but as the IDF perpetrated huge civilian losses in Gaza, it did not hesitate to call for the stoppage of Israeli operations and the resumption of talks for a solution to the long-standing Palestinian issue on the basis of the ‘two-state’ formula.

Finally, the two prime security concerns of India are the radicalized Pak-Afghan region that witnessed the continuing patronization of the Kabul Emirate by Pakistan and the deepening Sino-Pak alliance that was leading to these two adversaries undertaking covert operations against this country. India is legitimately disappointed that the US is still not taking adequate notice of Pakistan's role in fostering Islamic extremism and militancy. On the other hand, Russia seemed to better understand the threat of ‘radicalization’ that bothers India.

In any case, it is India that has to counter Pakistan and China largely on its own, and it is a matter of great satisfaction that the Modi government was totally geared to handling this challenge. (IANS)