Ladakh disengagement is good, but what about Eastern Himalayas?

Amitava Mukherjee

(The author is a senior journalist and commentator)  

There is now an atmosphere of excitement in the corridors of power in New Delhi. Military disengagement with China in eastern Ladakh has taken place. Armies of China and India have reportedly pulled back in Depsung and Demchok. This is good. But there is still a veil of silence over the ‘Finger’ points in the Pangong Tso lake area. Previously, India used to patrol till Finger 8. After the Chinese incursion, this came down up to Finger 4. What will happen here? Would India have to cede the area between the two abovementioned fingers? Till now, no clear cut official standpoint is available.

So, causes of worry remain. At the same time, there are glimmers of hope also. Xu Feihong, Chinese envoy to New Delhi, has expressed that relations between China and India are now standing at a new starting point with new development opportunities.

Is it really so? In 1962 also Chou en Lai, the then Chinese Premiere, had said many such pious words before his army swooped down on North Eastern India and reached up to Bomdilla, situated deep in Arunachal Pradesh and right up to the borders of Assam.

New Delhi must always keep in mind that in Chinese geopolitical interests, Arunachal Pradesh is much more important to them than the Ladakh sector, where, in many stretches, “not even a blade of grass grows.” By a blitzkrieg in this sector, they can overrun Daulat Beg Oldi, India’s last military post, on the foot of the Karakoram pass and cut off the Siachin glacier. But how much can China gain by doing this? The DBO outpost can hardly threaten the China controlled Aksai Chin, which is five miles to the east. On the other hand, China is already in Pakistan through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) coming through Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir.

So, strategically, the importance of the western Himalayas is much less to China than it is in regard to the eastern Himalayas. Why is it so? The principal reason is China’s burgeoning water shortage and, at the same time, increasing demands for electricity. To overcome it, Beijing is building up hydroelectric dams on the Brahmaputra in Tibet, thereby blocking the free flow of river water to India.

Now, the river valleys of Arunachal Pradesh have immense hydropower potential, currently estimated at 50,328 megawatts, or approximately 22 percent of India’s power generating capacity. Control over this state would give China immense strategic security.

Interestingly, we have not heard anything from China in recent times for settling border problems in the eastern Himalayas, particularly in the McMahon Line sector that involves Arunachal Pradesh. On the contrary, it’renamed’ 30 places in this Indian state this year. On several occasions, China has included Arunachal Pradesh in its map.

With a certain motive, China is increasing its military capacity in the deep areas across Arunachal Pradesh. It is now well known that four sectors of the state, namely Asaphila, Tuting Axis, Chang Tze, and Fishtail 2, are under some kinds of Chinese threat.

There is no scope for oversatisfaction on the part of New Delhi over Bejing’s future moves vis-à-vis Arunachal Pradesh. It is because the Tawang monastery of the state is invaluable to China for control over Tibetan Buddhism, which in turn means complete control over Tibet, an area now occupying the central position in China’s foreign policy.

What would be New Delhi’s approach now? Confabulations over the proper alignment of the McMahon Line are welcome. But at the same time, New Delhi should always be prepared for some surprises.