New era: Tibetan diplomacy at a turning point

Dipak Kurmi

(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)

A high-profile American delegation, led by Michael McCaul and Nancy Pelosi from the US House of Representatives, recently visited Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, where they met with the Dalai Lama. This meeting holds significant geopolitical implications as it signals a shift in US policy towards Tibet. The delegation conveyed a firm message: the United States no longer recognises Tibet as a part of China. They announced plans for the “Resolve Tibet-China Act,” which is expected to become law soon. During their visit, the delegation prioritised meetings with the Tibetan spiritual leader before meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, underscoring their engagement with the Tibetan government-in-exile. The Indian government welcomed the delegation without hesitation, despite potential diplomatic repercussions with China. This stance has resonated strongly in Beijing, where Chinese leaders have historically asserted control over Tibet, tracing back to Mao Zedong’s claim of’suzerainty’ over the region.

The Chinese claim over Tibet as a province and subsequent efforts to suppress its culture, heritage, and language trace back to the aftermath of World War II. The strategic decisions made during the war, such as allowing the Soviet Red Army to enter and occupy Berlin first, inadvertently bolstered Stalin’s perception of Soviet dominance in post-war Europe. By 1949, the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons further solidified this perception, despite their economic and military limitations beyond Eurasia. These historical events set the stage for the geopolitical dynamics that continue to influence relations in the region today.

The United States’ initial overestimation of Communist China during the mid-20th century contrasted sharply with the perceived instability of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang regime on the mainland. Despite Mao Zedong’s Maoists demonstrating greater ideological commitment, this assessment didn’t justify the exclusion of Chiang Kai-shek’s government and Taiwan from the United Nations. India, by all accounts a more fitting candidate, was overlooked in favour of accommodating Communist China’s entry into the global stage. The Nehru government’s steadfast support for recognising Red China’s status highlights a significant diplomatic decision reflective of the complex international dynamics of that era.

For years, the US State Department maintained the belief that the Soviet Union and China operated as a unified communist bloc. It wasn’t until the Sino-Soviet conflict erupted along the Ussuri River in 1969 that the true depth of animosity between the two communist powers became unmistakably clear. This clash marked a pivotal moment, revealing the significant discord and strategic rivalry that had long simmered beneath the surface of international communist solidarity.

Following the Sino-Soviet clash in 1969, President Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972, under the guidance of Dr. Henry Kissinger, marked a turning point. This diplomatic thaw significantly elevated China’s global standing, paving the way for Deng Xiaoping’s transformative economic reforms focused on manufacturing and exports. China’s subsequent economic boom, fueled largely by exports to the United States, underscored its newfound economic prowess. Amid these developments, the US State Department has long overlooked the plight of Tibetans under Chinese rule since 1959. The reasons for this neglect remain unclear—are they due to ongoing tensions over Taiwan or perhaps broader geopolitical considerations yet to be fully understood? Time may shed light on these intentions. India’s stance in this dynamic has also been pivotal. While leftist factions in the country swiftly advocated for recognising the new Chinese regime after its civil war victory, Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel took a more cautious approach. In November 1949, he sought American counsel through Charge d’Affairs Donovan to assess the urgency of recognising Communist China—an early indicator of India’s nuanced diplomacy in a changing global landscape.

Given Sardar Patel’s extensive correspondence with Jawaharlal Nehru regarding China, his primary concern likely centred on ensuring mutual recognition of the Sino-Indian border. However, Nehru, eager to move swiftly, informed the Chinese of India’s decision to recognise their regime in December of that year without consulting the Sardar. This action underscored differing perspectives within India’s leadership on how best to navigate relations with the emerging Communist power.

Upon receiving Nehru’s message of recognition, China also presented several conditions. Firstly, India was to transfer all properties and assets belonging to China to the new regime. Secondly, India agreed not to recognise any members of the Kuomintang (KMT). Thirdly, India was expected to support the expulsion of nationalist China from the United Nations and endorse its replacement by the communist regime. China’s intentions reveal a calculated strategy, evident from the communist regime’s swift declaration of Tibet’s “liberation” by the People’s Liberation Army just a day before the founding of the People’s Republic of China. This move followed the expulsion of the Chinese Amban by Tibetans, despite his affiliation with the Kuomintang government.

The Chinese accusation against India portrayed Nehru as a puppet of British imperialism, alleging his role in the historical humiliation of China, a narrative Mao aimed to reverse. China’s People’s Daily editorial criticised the concept of suzerainty as oppressive, despite China’s own historical demands over Tibet. The editorial even urged the UN to scrutinise India’s ties with Bhutan. Despite warnings, including those from Ambassador K.M. Pannikar, the Nehru government overlooked China’s broader ambitions extending to Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Nehru, known for his advocacy of global peace and unity, remained unaware of these strategic maneuvers. The consequences were felt acutely in Tibet and India alike.