The road of confrontation

Air Marshal (Retd) Pranab Kumar Barbora wanted to reactivate IAF's Doulat Beg Oldi (DBO) airstrip situated near the Karakoram Pass and sought permission in this regard from the then Government of India's Defense Ministry. The permission was refused but the ministry did not give any reason. Barbora was desperate as in the core of his heart he felt that immediate reactivation of the airstrip, first created during the Indo-China war of 1962, was urgently necessary. So he decided to defy the government of India, sat on the cockpit of an AN-32 cargo aircraft, took off and ultimately landed in the DBO airstrip. The airfield thus again came into operation.

Amitava Mukherjee

(Amitava Mukherjee is a senior journalist and commentator. He can be reached at amitavamukherjee253@gmail.com)

Air Marshal (Retd) Pranab Kumar Barbora is an exceptional person. Barbora, an ace pilot and a former Vice Chief of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in charge of its Western Command in 2008, was extremely perturbed about the safety and security of India in the face of aggressive postures of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the Ladakh sector. So he wanted to reactivate IAF's Doulat Beg Oldi (DBO) airstrip situated near the Karakoram Pass and sought permission in this regard from the then Government of India's Defense Ministry. The permission was refused but the ministry did not give any reason. Barbora was desperate as in the core of his heart he felt that immediate reactivation of the airstrip, first created during the Indo-China war of 1962, was urgently necessary. So he decided to defy the government of India, sat on the cockpit of an AN-32 cargo aircraft, took off and ultimately landed in the DBO airstrip. The airfield thus again came into operation.

To understand the strategic importance of Daulat Beg Oldi we have to look at the cartographical position of Ladakh, formerly a part of Jammu and Kashmir and now a separate Union Territory of India. Ladakh is bounded on the east by China and the disputed territory of Aksai Chin, on the north by China, on the north-west by the Pakistan occupied Gilgit-Baltistan, on the west by the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and on the south by Himachal Pradesh. On the tri-junction of Ladakh, the Xinjiang province of China and the Gilgit-Baltistanlies the Siachen glacier. Through the Aksai Chin China has constructed a road connecting Tibet with the Xinjiang province and then from the Xinjiang province through the Pakistan occupied Gilgit-Baltistan and then through Baluchistan is coming up the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor(CPEC) for reaching the Gwadar port on the Indian Ocean, Beijing's most important lifeline for its One Belt one Road (OBOR) initiative.

How does Daulat Beg Oldi come in this strategic scenario? Well, it is situated at the extreme north-west corner of Ladakh, at the feet of the Karakoram Pass which separates India from the Xinjiang province of China. The above mentioned airstrip is just 8 kilometres south of the Chinese border and 9 kilometres north-west of the Aksai Chin Line of Actual Control (LAC). India has a military outpost at the Daulat Beg Oldi. So for China the place is a double-edged military threat, not only to the CPEC but to the existing Karakoram Highway which connects China and Pakistan.

In 1962 the PLA of China had easily overrun the Indian military post at DBO. But things have vastly changed after the heroic act of Air Marshal Barbora. The IAF carries routine sorties using AN-32 aircrafts to provide relief and supplies to the troops stationed nearby. Situations turned further in India's favour when the IAF landed C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft which is capable of carrying up to 20 tonnes of load. All these have unnerved China to such an extent that in 2013 the PLA infiltrated up to 19 kilometres inside the DBO sector and set up posts in the Depsang Valley. After a few weeks they withdrew.

This was the eye opener for India after decades of pusillaminous attitudes so as not to do any infrastructural developments along the LAC lest China should get infuriated. The result is the completion of the Dabruk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) road which will connect Leh, the headquarters of Ladakh with the DBO in a very short time span of just six hours. Previously there were two routes for reaching up to the remote DBO military post- one along the Nubra valley traversing through the Saser La pass at a height of approximately 16,000 feet. It is a foot track and would require three to four days to cover. Not being motorable only mule trains were possible on it. This was the route India was forced to look up to during the 1962 war. Not surprisingly the result was devastating for it as the DBO post had to surrender due to lack of supply. The second route used to run along the Shyok river- Depsang La pass-Depsang plains at almost the same altitude.

The new DSDBO road has a good number of bridges and viaducts. Moreover India has laid stress on constructing quite a few east-west feeder roads bisecting the main DSDBO road at certain points. One such road runs up to the LAC through the Galwan valley. This has become a headache for China because Indian patrol parties can reach up to the Tibetan border through this road. Therefore Beijing is bent on controlling the high mountain ridges that overlook not only the Galwan valley and the feeder road but certain portions of the DSDBO as well. The recent clash between Indian and PLA soldiers resulting in casualties on both sides is a direct result of clash of this strategic interest.

It has been reported in the media that China has been stockpiling large number of PLA soldiers and considerable amount of ammunition on their side of the border. It is difficult to speculate how the situation will shape up in future. India's strategic needs demand three things- further strengthening the firepower of the DBO airstrip and the military post situated nearby, ensuring the security of the DSDBO road and the feeder one passing through Galwan valley and finally bringing on diplomatic and military pressure on the China/Pakistan combine to halt construction of the CPEC through Gilgit-Baltistan.

There is no reason to believe that India is unprepared although there is scope to doubt whether India has responded in the Galwan valley at the right time. For the Indian army it is important to note that China has brought Tibet and Xinjiang under a single military command. Obviously Beijing wants to calibrate its response in the Ladakh sector particularly in the light of the fact that it has constructed a string of air bases in Tibet and has positioned DF-31 and DG-31A Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles there.

However India can also match in an adequate manner. At the time of the Kargil war India had only one army brigade in eastern Ladakh. Now the number is three backed by reserve forces somewhere behind the advance ones on the LAC. The total number of Indian tanks in this sector is more than 100. Advanced landing grounds for IAF planes have come up, apart from the DBO, at Fukche and Nyoma. They will give logistical support to India's existing airbases at Lehand Thoise.

Finally one note of caution. Diplomatic solutions are always better than military solutions. But one has to be on his guard so that diplomatic confabulations do not take the form of diversionary tactics. This is the lesson India had learnt through bitter experiences in 1962.